

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

TARONE WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:24-cv-1021

v.

Honorable Paul L. Maloney

DONALD SAPPANOS et al.,

Defendants.

**OPINION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

**Discussion**

**I. Factual Allegations**

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Following a jury trial in

the Berrien County Circuit Court, Plaintiff was convicted of one count of assault with intent to murder, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83; one count of second-degree murder, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317; and two counts of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. *People v. Washington*, No. 352408, 2021 WL 5232295, at \*1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2021). In 2020, the trial court sentenced Plaintiff to “concurrent terms of 18 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the conviction of assault with intent to murder and 31 to 75 years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, and 2 years’ consecutive imprisonment for each felony-firearm conviction to be served concurrently with each other.” *Id.*; see MDOC Offender Tracking Information System, <https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=592797> (last visited Oct. 9, 2024).

In his complaint, Plaintiff sues his former criminal defense attorneys, Donald Sappanos and Caleb M. Grimes, for their actions and inactions in representing Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution and conviction. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3–5.)<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff requests monetary damages. (*Id.*, PageID.6.)

## **II. Failure to State a Claim**

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff’s complaint concerns an action “by a prisoner currently in custody, whether or not it relates to his confinement . . . not classifiable under any other nature of suit category under Prisoner Petitions . . . .” See Civil Nature of Suit Code Descriptions “540” (rev. Apr. 2021). Accordingly, the Court will direct the Clerk to update the docket to reflect that this action is a prisoner petition with nature of suit code “540.”

and conclusions. *Id.*; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Id.* at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). It is well-settled that retained and appointed attorneys functioning as defense counsel do not act “under color of law” and are not state actors subject to suit under § 1983. *See White v. Robertson-Deming*, 9 F. App’x 418, 419–20 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing *Polk County v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)); *Otworth v. Vanderploeg*, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a § 1983 claim against his former attorneys,

Defendants Sappanos and Grimes, as they were not acting under the color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

### III. State Law Claims

As noted above, claims under § 1983 can only be brought for "deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. *Pyles v. Raisor*, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); *Sweeton*, 27 F.3d at 1166. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court's supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claim, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction.

Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. *See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris*, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff's federal law claim, it should not reach state law claims." (citing *United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))); *Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc.*, 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, "[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues." *Landefeld*, 994 F.2d at 1182; *see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply*, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law issues." (internal quotations omitted)). Dismissal, however, remains "purely discretionary." *Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio*,

*Inc.*, 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); *Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC*, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).

Here, because Plaintiff's federal claims will be dismissed in their entirety, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff's state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to raise those claims in the state courts.

### **Conclusion**

The Court will direct the Clerk to classify this case under Nature of Suit Code 540. Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's federal claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's state-law claims without prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to raise those claims in the state courts.

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. *Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the full appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred

from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, *e.g.*, by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: October 17, 2024

/s/ Paul L. Maloney  
Paul L. Maloney  
United States District Judge